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This study tests the efficiency wage hypothesIs by estimating wage 
and quit equations with data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot 
Project survey of firms. An efficiency wage model is derived that pre-
dicts effects of turnover costs and unemployment on wages as functions 
of first and second derivatives from the quit equation. The model is 
tested by examining the relationships between the coefficients in the 
wage and quit equations; the results are generally favorable to efficiency 
wage theory. Other Important findings are that firm characteristics 
raising workers' productivity tend to raise wages and that a rise in 
turnover costs reduces quits. 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, economists have developed efficiency wage models to 
explain wage ngldity. If workers' productivity depends positively or firms' 
costs depend negatively on the wage, firms may find it optimal to pay a 
wage above the market-clearing level, resulting in involuntary unemploy-
ment. At least four models have been developed to explain why productivity 
or costs can depend on the wage. In Weiss (1980) a more productive pool 
of applicants applies to the firm as it raises its wage offer. In addition, a 
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higher wage may induce workers to work harder, either out of gratitude 
toward the firm as in Akerlof (1982, 1984) or because of the increased cost 
of losing their jobs as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Finally, in Stiglitz 
(1974), Schlicht (1978), and Salop (1979), a firm's turnover costs depend 
negatively on the wage If fewer workers quit as the wage rises. Since hiring 
and training new workers is costly, firms may find it profitable to pay a 
wage above the market-cleanng level to reduce turnover. 
Testing these hypotheses has been difficult. These models make predic-
tions about the behavior of firms, and little data exist on wages at the firm 
level. One study that tests the efficiency wage hypothesis with firm-level 
data is Leonard (1987), which examines the relationship between mOnI-
toring intensity and wages with data from 200 plants in the high-technology 
sector of one state. Other studies such as DiCkens and Katz (1987) and 
Krueger and Summers (1987,1988) estimate wage equations that include 
dummy variables for workers' Industry affiliation. Since the competitive 
model of the labor market predicts that workers of identical quality earn 
the same wage in any industry, the authors interpret the signIficant coef-
ficients on these dummy variables as evidence for efficiency wage theory. 
This study tests the predictions of efficiency wage theory by estimating 
wage equations and quit equations with data obtained from the Employ-
ment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) survey of firms, a survey of over 
5,000 firms in 28 geographic sites and 66 two-digit standard industrial 
classifications (SIC) Industries. A firm's behavior in setting wages is modeled 
under the assumption that the quit rate of its workers (and hence the firm's 
costs of hiring and training new workers) depends negatively on the wage. 
The model makes predictions about the size of the derivative of the quit 
rate with respect to the wage and about the effects of turnover costs and 
unemployment on wages as functions of first and second derivatives of 
the qUIt equation. It also predicts that a nse in turnover costs ought to 
lower the quit rate. In Appendix A, a more general model is derived in 
which wages affect productivIty as well as turnover. This model shows 
that firm charactenstics raising productivIty ought to raise wages in an 
efficiency wage model. In addition, the more general model demonstrates 
that the relationships derived in the model ignoring the effect of wages on 
productivity may not be exact. Instead, the effect of turnover costs and 
unemployment on wages will be somewhat smaller than predicted by the 
model that does not account for the effect of wages on productivity. The 
theoretical model is tested by estimating wage equations and quit equations 
with data from the EOPP survey, which includes questions about the firm's 
most recently hired worker. 
The results are generally supportive of efficiency wage theory. The effect 
of turnover costs on wages is positive, as predicted. But its magnItude is 
smaller than predicted by the model ignoring productivity, possibly because 
of the additional effect of productivity on wages. That reducing turnover 
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is an important consideration for firms with high turnover costs is further 
evidenced by the finding that a rise in turnover costs lowers quits, even 
when controlling for the wage. The effect of the industry unemployment 
rate on wages is negative, as predicted, but again its magnitude is smaller 
than predicted by the model ignonng productivity. It is also found that 
characteristics of the firm that raise workers' productivity tend to raise 
wages. However, the effect of the local unemployment rate on wages is 
insignificant, possibly because higher wages serve as a compensating dif-
ferential for areas with high unemployment. In addition, the denvative of 
the quit rate with respect to the wage IS smaller than it should be if firms 
are maximizing short-run profits and if turnover costs are an Important 
part of effiCiency wage theory. 
This study differs from most previous work m that it concentrates on 
the labor turnover version of efficiency wage theory, whereas most previous 
research on efficiency wage theory has centered on models in which work-
ers' effort depends on the wage. The advantage of dealmg with the turnover 
model is that the effect of wages on qUits can be estimated, whereas it is 
nearly impossible to measure the effect of wages on productivity. In ad-
dition, even if a positive correlation between a worker's wage and pro-
ductivity is observed, it is extremely difficult to discern whether the higher 
productivity results from the higher wage or whether skills that cannot be 
measured with the available data are responsible for both the higher wage 
and the higher productivity. Thus, researchmg the labor turnover model 
may be a more promismg approach than researching models in which 
productivity depends on the wage. However, the fact that thiS study ex-
amines only the effect of wages on qUits means that the model cannot be 
tested exactly. Thus, while the results support the qualitative predictions 
of the model, they fall short quantitatively. 
II. An Efficiency Wage Model of the Firm 
In efficiency wage models, firms pay a wage that exceeds the wage nec-
essary to attract the number of workers they hire. In other words, the 
amount of labor a firm hires is less than the amount of labor supplied to 
the firm at the wage It is offenng, so that its labor supply constramt is not 
bmding. Thus, the firm chooses both the wage and employment level that 
maximize profits. In contrast, a firm not paying efficiency wages either 
pays a wage determined by the market (if it faces a horizontal labor supply 
curve) or chooses the wage that maximizes profits, subject to the labor 
supply constramt (if It faces an upward-slopmg labor supply curve). This 
section derives an efficiency wage model in which higher wages reduce 
turnover, and it compares the predictions of thiS model with models in 
which the firm is on ItS labor supply curve. The effect of wages on pro-
ductivity is ignored m this section to concentrate on the effect of wages 
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on turnover costs. As noted above, in Appendix A a more general model 
IS presented in which wages affect both productivity and labor turnover. 
Consider a firm that is a price taker at the price P in the product market 
and that produces output with a Cobb-Douglas production function, Q 
= y L U K I - u • Assume that the firm incurs a cost of 'tq( w, w a , U)L in hiring 
and training new workers, where 't is the cost of hinng and training each 
worker and q( W, w a , U) is the quit rate. The quit rate depends on the 
wage (w), the wage the worker could earn elsewhere (w a ), and the unem-
ployment rate (U), where qw < 0, qww > 0, and qu < O. In addition, it IS 
likely that quits become less responsive to the wage (i.e., qw becomes less 
negative) as U increases, I so that qwu > o. Under these assumptions, the 
profit function is 
(1) 
Simtlar models are found in Stiglitz (1974), Salop (1979), and FIacco 
and Zeager (1989).2 If (1) IS differentiated with respect to w, L, and K, 
the first-order conditions are 
0= drc/dw = -L - 'tq",(w, w a , U)L, (2a) 
0= drc/dL = aPyp-1K I - u - w - r.q(w, w a , U), (2b) 
and 
0= drc/dK = (1 - a)PyLUK-U - r. (2c) 
From equation (2a), w can be determined independently of Land K. 
From this equation, we can derive three conditions that will be met if 
firms pay effiCiency wages. Dividing (2a) by L yields the first condition: 3 
1 For example, a change In the wage wtll probably have a greater effect on the 
quit rate If the unemployment rate is 6% than If it IS 25%. At an unemployment 
rate of 25%, a change in the wage will have a negltgible effect on the quit rate since 
so few workers quit to begin with. 
2 There are differences In the way these authors specify the qUit function, however. 
Stlghtz is concerned with the question of unemployment In less developed countnes 
(LDCs) and models quits as a function of the ratio between urban and rural wages 
as well as the unemployment rate and the firm's relative wage. Salop expresses the 
qUit rate as q( w / z), where z is a measure of labor market tightness that incorporates 
the average wage rate and the unemployment rate In FIacco and Zeager (1989), 
the quit rate depends only on the firm's wage. QUitS also depend negatively on the 
wage III Schhcht (1978), but in hiS model a nse in turnover reduces productiVity 
rather than Increases costs. 
3 Except for differences In the way that the quit function is expressed, condltJon 
A IS essentially derived III Stiglitz (1974), Salop (1979), and FIacco and Zeager 
(1989). In addltJon, Leonard (1987) basically tests thiS condition, although he does 
not exphcitly denve It. 
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't oQuit 
w 0 log(w) 
1. 
(This can also be expressed as -'tqw( W, w a , U) = 1.) 
Campbell 
(A) 
Differentiating condition (A) with respect to w, 't, and U yields two 
additional conditions that will be met if firms pay efficiency wages: 
dw qw 
-=--->0 




A fourth testable prediction can be denved from the effect of wages on 
quits and from the fact that condition (B) demonstrates that a rise in turn-
over costs raises wages: 
dq/d't = (dq/dw)(dw/d't) < O. (D) 
Condition (D) states that firms with the highest turnover costs will have 
the lowest quit rates since these firms have the greatest incentive to deter 
workers from quitting by paying high wages. This condition will obviously 
be satisfied if a rise in turnover costs raises wages and if a rise in wages 
decreases quits. A more interesting test would be to examine whether a 
rise in turnover costs reduces quits even when controlling for the wage. 
If this is true, It would suggest that firms with high turnover costs con-
sCiously try to reduce quits through actions such as offering generous fringe 
benefits, providmg good working conditions, and maintaining good man-
agement-worker relationships, in addition to paying high wages.4 
In Appendix A, a more general efficiency wage model IS derived in 
which workers' effort and quits both depend on the wage. In this model, 
e( w, rJ» represents the productivIty of a worker as a function of the wage 
and of firm characteristics that raise the productivity of workers (rJ». In 
the model m Appendix A, another condition is derived that Will be satlsfied 
4 The fact that a rise m turnover costs reduces quits even when controllmg for 
the wage can also be seen by including a parameter (e.g., A) m the quit equation 
that represents actions (besides paying high wages) a firm could take to reduce 
turnover and letting C(A) represent the cost of these actions. Note that 'A probably 
would not be observable to an econometnclan. Under reasonable conditions (I e., 
If qWA IS small), It can be shown that dq/dt = (dq/d'A)(dAjdt) < O. 
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if firms pay efficiency wages: that firm characteristics that raise the pro-
ductivity of workers will also raise their wages. 
In addition, conditions (A), (B), and (C) do not hold exactly in the more 
general model. In particular, -'tqw < 1, dw/d't < -qw/'tqww, and I dw/ 
d VI < I-qwu/ qww I. However, in Appendix A, it is shown that the left-
hand sides of conditions (B) and (C) should be at least a reasonable fraction 
(e.g., at least about 20%) of the right-hand sides. Thus, if wages affect both 
productivity and turnover, these conditions will not be exactly satisfied 
but will instead provide a general range for the coefficients in the wage 
and quit equations. 
Another reason why condition A may not be exactly satisfied is that 
firms may pay efficiency wages designed to maximize long-run profits. A 
firm that is not labor-supply constrained might choose a low wage to 
maximize current profits. But if the current wage affects future productivity 
and turnover costs, the firm may find it optimal to pay a much higher 
wage to maximize the present discounted value of current and future profits. 
For example, a firm should pay a higher wage if it expected to survive 
indefinitely than if it expected to close down in the near future. Future 
productivity or turnover costs could depend on current wages if the quality 
of future applicants depends on the current wage because it takes time for 
firms to develop a reputation for paying high wages, if workers' gratitude 
and loyalty are earned through a hiStory of good wages, or if it takes time 
for workers dissatisfied with their current wage to find another job. If 
firms pay efficiency wages designed to maximize long-run profits, it is 
possible that the values of 'tqw estimated in this study will be smaller than 
condition A predicts since the total effect of wages on quits may be larger 
than the estimated value of qw. 5 
In contrast to the effiCiency wage model, if firms hire in a competitive 
and frictionless labor market, labor is supplied elastically at the market 
wage. Thus, hiring costs should have no effect on wages, and training costs 
should raise wages only to the extent they raise productivity. In addition, 
characteristics of a firm would probably have no effect on wages since 
labor mobility would ensure that workers of identical ability are paid the 
same wage in all firms. The only channel through which characteristics of 
the firm could be related to the wage would be if the unmeasured portion 
of workers' skills were correlated with charactenstlcs of the firms that 
tend to raise productivity (e.g., if firms With high capital-labor ratios tend 
to hire workers who are more skilled than predicted by the characteristics 
reported III the survey). 
Finally, in Appendix B a model is developed in which firms are labor-
supply constrained and face an upward-sloping supply curve for labor 
5 Even if current wages affects future qUitS, Campbell (1990) shows that under 
reasonable condltlons, conditions (B) and (C) Will not be affected. 
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(i.e., they act as monopsonists). In this case the effect of turnover costs 
and unemployment on wages is ambiguous. A nse in turnover costs en-
courages firms to pay higher wages to reduce turnover but at the same 
time reduces labor demand, tendmg to lower wages. Similarly, a rise in 
the unemployment rate will reduce turnover, thereby lessening the need 
to pay high wages. But It also raises the demand for labor since workers 
are now less likely to quit. Not only are the signs of dw / d't and dw / d U 
ambiguous, but more Important, there is no systematic relationship between 
the derivatives of the quit equation and either dw/d't or dw/dU. Thus, 
if firms do not pay efficiency wages, there is no reason for conditions (B) 
and (C) to be satisfied or for the right-hand sides and left-hand sides of 
conditions (B) and (C) to be of even the same order of magnitude. 
Recall that conditions (B) and (C) were derived from a model in which 
firms set both the wage and employment, meanmg that they maximize 
profits by operatmg at a pomt above their labor supply curves. In contrast, 
if firms operate on their labor supply curves, condltlons (B) and (C) would 
not be satisfied except by chance. Finding that these conditions are satisfied 
would thus be strong eVidence for effiCiency wage theory. 
To the contrary, in a model in which firms are labor-supply constrained 
and face an upward-sloping labor supply curve, characteristics of the firm 
that mcrease productivity will also raise wages. Thus, a finding that firm 
characteristics that raise productivity also raise wages might be consistent 
With a model m which firms are on their labor supply curves and thus 
would not be strong evidence in favor of efficiency wage theory. 
III. Data 
The data were obtained from interviews conducted as part of the Em-
ployer OpportUlllty Pilot Project survey of employers. This survey was 
conducted in the spring of 1980 with 5,302 firms in 28 geographical areas 
in 11 different states. These firms represented 66 two-digit SIC industnes 
and 545 four-digit SIC industries. Included m the survey were a series of 
questions concernmg the personal characteristics, the occupation, the wage, 
and the number of hours spent hinng and trainmg the most recently hired 
worker.6 The data were supplemented with the unemployment rate in the 
6 Two years later, 3,413 (64%) of the onglnal firms were relntervlewed and were 
asked a SImIlar series of questions. ThIS study uses data from the first survey because 
the second survey contains fewer observations, because the second survey was 
conducted dunng the deepest recessIOn In the past 50 years, and because the sample 
of firms In the second survey wIll not be representative if firms were excluded from 
this survey in a systematic fashion (e.g., because they went out of business). Regres-
sions run with data from the second EOPP survey generally corroborated the 
results of the first survey, even though the second survey contained a dIfferent set 
of wage and turnover van abies. (See Campbell [1990] for a more in-depth treatment 
of these results.) 
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local labor market and with the unemployment rate and capital-labor ratio 
for the two-digit SIC industry. 
IV. Empirical Results 
In order to explore whether the conditions of Section II are satisfied, 
wage equations and quit equations were estimated with data on the most 
recently hired worker from the EOPP survey. Table 1 lists the variable 
names, a brief descriptIOn of the variables, their means, and their standard 
deViations. Note that two wage vanables are available: the current starting 
wage (at the time of the survey) and the current top wage of the job for 
which the worker was hired.7 
Wage Equation 
Table 2 reports the results of regressions with the starting wage as the 
dependent van able, and table 3 reports the results of regressions with the 
top wage as the dependent variable. The independent variables include 
worker characteristics, measures of the time spent hiring and training the 
worker, the unemployment rate, and firm characteristics. 
The worker charactenstics are age, sex, experience, and education. Also 
included are dummy variables for the worker's occupation and geographic 
region. The costs of recruiting and trainmg are measured by the number 
of hours spent recruiting, screening, and interviewing for the position 
(SCREENING) and by the number of hours spent onenting and training 
the worker in the first month of employment (TRAINING). Condition 
B predicts that a rise in these costs wtll raise the wage. 
According to condition (C), a rise in the unemployment rate will lower 
the wage. Both the unemployment rate in the local labor market and in 
the industry are included in the regressions. Recall that the wage variables 
are the job's startmg wage and top wage at the time of the survey, which 
occurred in the spnng of 1980. Smce unemployment tends to affect 
wages with a slight lag, unemployment rates from 1979 were used m the 
regreSSIOns. 
The firm characteristics are the proportion of workers unionized at the 
firm, the capital-labor ratio for the two-digit SIC mdustry, the proportions 
of the firm's work force classified as white-collar and as craft workers, the 
firm's size, and dummy variables for the one-digit SIC industry. 
The expanded model in Appendix A predicts that a nse in firm char-
actenstics that raise the productivity of workers will increase the wage. 
Firm characteristics that may raise productivity are the capital-labor ratio 
7 Another vanable, the current wage of the most recently hired worker, is also 
available However, It IS not reported In cases where the worker had left the firm 
before the date of the survey. Wage equations were not estimated With thiS vanable 
because of pOSSible sample selection bias. 
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Table 1 
Variable Names, Descriptions, Means, and Standard Deviations 
Jl cr 
STARTING WAGE Log of the starting wage 1344 345 
TOP WAGE Log of the top wage 1608 409 
QUIT = 1 If worker qUit, = 0 otherwise 217 412 
AGE Age of worker when hired 2680 9.74 
1 IF MALE = 1 If male, = 0 If female .493 .500 
EXPERIENCE Months of useful Job expenence 4337 6535 
EDUCATION Years of education 1209 163 
SCREENING Hours spent recrumng, screening, 577 1504 
and mtervlewmg for the 
posmon 
TRAINING Hours spent onentmg and tramIng 
the new recruit 
3385 3681 
LOCAL UNEMP RATE' Unemkloyment rate In local labor 0622 0151 
mar et 
LOCAL UNEMP RATEt Unemkloyment rate in local labor 0638 0273 
mar et 
INDUSTRY UNEMP RATE* Unemployment rate In Industry 0606 .0241 
INDUSTRY UNEMP RA TEt Unemployment rate In Industry 0658 0346 
VARIANCE OF IND UNEMP Vanance of Industry 146 .586 
unemployment rate 
PCTUNION Proportion of firm's work force 108 .284 
unionized 
CAPITAL EQUIP-LABOR Industry ratio of caetal eJUIpment .0113 0157 
RATIO to labor (in $ mil IOns 0 capital 
per worker) 
CAPITAL-LABOR RATIO Industry ratio of capital to labor 0239 .0478 
(In $ millIOns of capital per 
worker) 
PCT WHITE-COLLAR Prof-0rtlon of workers at firm 361 317 
c asslfied as white-collar 
PCTCRAFT ProportIOn claSSified as craft .163 .248 
workers 
FIRM SIZE Log of firm's employment 300 153 
* Unemployment rate In 1979 These figures are used In the wage equations 
t Average unemployment rate In the period over which the worker was employed These figures are 
used In the qUIt equation 
and the proportion of workers classified as white-collar or as craft workers. 
The greater is a firm's capital-labor ratio, the greater is the increase in 
output resulting from an increase m workers' effort, glvmg firms with a 
high capital-labor ratio an incentive to pay higher wages.8 In addition, a 
firm with a high capital-labor ratio will experience greater losses if its 
workers shirk and damage equipment. The potential gain from an increase 
in workers' effort and the potential loss from their shirkmg are probably 
8 ThiS relationship between the capital-labor ratio and the wage can also be 
derived by assuming that the value of a differs between firms. If eqq. (A6) and 
(A7) are differentiated with respect to a, and a is treated as an exogenous variable, 
then it can be shown that as long as k is defined to be greater than one, dw / da 
and dk / d a will be positively correlated. 
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more closely related to the stock of capital equipment than to the total 
capital stock (structures + equipment). Accordingly, the capital equip-
ment/labor ratio appears in five of the six equations. 
White-collar and craft workers are generally considered the most highly 
skilled workers. The proportions of these workers at the firm are included 
because working with highly skilled coworkers should increase one's own 
productivity. Also, a worker shirking and wasting the time of highly skilled 
coworkers imposes a greater cost on the firm. A nse in these proportions 
should thus raise the wage. 
The basic regression appears in column 1 of tables 2 and 3. In column 
2 the industry dummy variables are omltted.9 Because the turnover variables 
may be correlated with each other, they are entered separately in columns 
3 and 4. In column 5 the industry unemployment rate IS omitted to con-
centrate on the local unemployment rate since workers who change jobs 
are probably more likely to stay in the same area than to stay in the same 
mdustry. Finally, in column 6 the total capital-labor ratio replaces the 
capital equipment/labor ratio. 
Quit Equation 
Table 4 reports the results of quit equations estimated with data on the 
last worker hired. The dependent variable is the length of the worker's 
employment spell. Since this variable is usually censored, the quit function 
was estimated with a proportional hazard model assuming an exponential 
distribution. lo The independent variables are the wage, the wage the worker 
could earn elsewhere, personal characteristics of the worker, the cost of 
hiring and training, the unemployment rate, and characteristics of the firm. 
If high wages represent economic rent and not Just unmeasured differ-
ences in ability, the quit rate will depend negatively on the wage. Workers 
should decide whether to quit on the basis of the wage they expect to earn 
if they remain with the firm rather than on their starting wage. Thus, the 
wage variable included in the regressions is the top wage of the Job. The 
quit rate should also depend positively on the worker's alternate wage. 
Since it is impossible to measure this variable directly, the wage was re-
gressed on characteristics of the worker, and the predicted values of the 
wage were used as estimates of the alternate wage. 11 
9 In col. 2, the vanance of the llldustry unemployment rate IS included as an 
llldependent variable Sillce industnes with more vanable unemployment tend to 
pay higher wages as a compensatlllg differential. This varIable becomes lllslgmficant, 
however, when the industry dummy varIables are included. 
'0 See Kiefer (1988) for a descnptlon of hazard models. I also estimated the 
equations with a Weibull dlstnbution but could not reject the hypotheSIS that the 
spells were distributed exponentially. 
" Murphy and Topel (1985) demonstrate that the coefficient on the predicted 
value of a variable obtained from an earlIer regressIOn IS consistently estimated. 
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Table 2 
Wage Equations with the Log of the Starting Wage as the Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
0 
(4) (5) (6) 
0 
""0 Constant 447 .182 440 436 290 .443 -::; (6.57) (279) (6.57) (644) (4.51) (649) cO' 
;::!: Worker charactenstlcs. 
@ AGE/l 00 194 2.06 200 1.93 2.03 1.93 
N (6.40) (6.66) (6.70) (6.37) (665) (6.36) 0 
~ (AGE/l 00)' -245 -2.53 -2.55 -244 -2.55 -243 
~ ... (-5.68) (-572) (-595) (-5.67) (-586) (-5.62) \J> 1 IF MALE 153 .156 153 152 .157 157 N 
;0 (1289) (1290) (13 08) (1281) (13.17) (13 25) cO' 
::r EXPERIENCE/1 00 131 .134 .127 .131 .123 .130 
Cii (6.90) (6.93) (682) (6.96) (6.47) (6.87) 
;0 (EXPERIENCE/l 00)' -.0260 -.0282 -.0246 -.0262 - 0245 -.0260 CD 
CJ) (-429) (-4.56) (-4.12) (-433) (-402) (-4.28) CD 
:< EDUCATION .0257 0265 0255 0261 0260 0259 CD 
(823) (8.30) (8.29) (839) (826) (8.26) c. 
Turnover costs. 
SCREENING/1 00 .0738 0822 0853 .0682 0762 
(242) (263) (2.83) (2.22) (249) 
TRAINING/l 00 0091 0079 0116 .0124 0108 
( 71) ( 60) ( 92) (.96) ( 83) 
Labor market conditions. 
LOCAL UNEMP RATE 0020 .0301 - 0319 0432 .0693 .0811 
( 04) ( 06) (-.07) ( 09) ( 15) ( 17) 
INDUSTRY UNEMP RATE -1.73 -135 -174 -1.67 -1.57 
(-6.76) (-5.65) (-6.93) (-6.56) (-619) 
0 VARIANCE OF IND UNEMP 0954 0 
-0 (9.14) -::; 
cO' FIrm charactenstlcs. 
;::!: PCTUNION .198 .195 .201 .200 198 201 
@ (1078) (1042) (11 17) (10.88) (10.69) (1086) 
N CAPITAL EQUIP-LABOR RATIO 1.99 2.51 199 1.97 156 0 
~ (474) (7.79) (4.82) (473) (374) 
~ .jo>. CAPITAL-LABOR RATIO 214 V> (1.67) 
;0 \.;J 
cO' PCT WHITE-COLLAR 0564 0537 .0523 .0578 .0720 .0578 
::r (3.03) (2.91) (2.85) (3.12) (386) (308) Cii PCTCRAFT 0678 0725 .0762 0731 .0815 0776 
;0 
(312) (3.31) (3.57) (3.38) (3.74) (358) CD 
CJ) 
FIRM SIZE .0203 .0209 0200 0207 0200 0202 CD 
:< (575) (599) (577) (591) (563) (5.66) CD c. 
Industry effects mcluded) yes no yes yes yes yes 
R2 498 471 498 .496 .489 .494 
N 2,820 2,820 2,928 2,842 2,820 2,820 
NOTE -t-statIstlcs are In parentheses To save space, cooefficlents on dummy variables representmg workers' occupatIOn, geographical reglOn, and mdustry are not reported 
but are avaIlable from the author on request 
Table 3 
Wage Equations with the Log of the Top Wage as the Dependent Variable 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0 
0 Constant .594 .319 607 594 415 .594 '0 
::; (6.25) (3.47) (6.40) (6.27) (4.61) (6.24) 
o· Worker charactenstlcs. ;::!: 
@ AGE/IOO 178 1.90 1.82 1.76 1.85 1.77 
N (4.08) (430) (417) (4.05) (4.23) (4.06) 
0 (AGE/tOO)' -2.42 -2.52 -249 -2.40 -2.49 -2.40 ~ 
.;.. 
(-384) (-393) (-393) (-382) (-3.92) (-380) 
~ V> I IF MALE .185 .191 184 186 .191 188 .;.. 
(1128) (11.46) (11.26) (1131) (1156) (t 147) ;0 
o· EXPERIENCE/I 00 \30 \39 116 .\33 .121 131 ::r 
Cii (4.72) (4.99) (4.23) (4.82) (4.36) (4.74) 
;0 (EXPERIENCE/tOO)' -.0238 -.0269 - 0214 -.0245 -.0219 -.0240 
CD (-2.59) (-2.89) (-234) (-2.67) (-2.38) (-2.62) CJ) 
CD EDUCATION 0305 .0321 .0324 0305 0311 0306 :< 
CD (6.94) (7.20) (742) (6.99) (7.04) (6.96) c. 
Turnover costs' 
SCREENING/I 00 0292 .0435 .0728 0208 .0291 
(.71) (104) (1.78) (.50) (.70) 
TRAINING/I 00 .124 .125 .127 .129 .125 
(6.80) (674) (703) (7.03) (685) 
Labor market conditions. 
LOCAL UNEMP RATE - 823 -.721 - 870 -.723 - 740 -.781 
(-1.27) (-110) (-136) (-112) (-1.14) (-121) 
INDUSTRY UNEMP RATE -2.02 -1.41 -2.16 -2.03 -1.92 
0 
(-5.53) (-419) (-601) (-557) (-532) 
0 VARIANCE OF IND UNEMP .110 
-0 (792) ::; 
:C''i" FIrm charactenstlcs: 
;::!: PCTUNION 154 .155 148 153 .154 .155 
@ (6.41) (6.40) (6.26) (6.39) (6.36) (6.46) 
N CAPITAL EQUIP-LABOR RATIO 102 1.91 I II 101 49 0 
~ (172) (4.18) (1.87) (1.70) (.84) 
~ ~ CAPITAL-LABOR RATIO 0353 
= V> ( 19) 
;0 V> PCT WHITE-COLLAR .0816 .0782 0754 0825 0998 .0810 cO' 
::r (309) (3.04) (289) (3 IS) (379) (305) Cii PCTCRAFT .213 .226 .223 212 230 .219 ;0 
CD (7.15) (7.56) (753) (7.14) (767) (735) 
CJ) 
CD FIRM SIZE .0186 .0146 .0190 .0185 .0183 .0183 
:< (3.88) (3.13) (3.99) (389) (379) (380) CD c. 
Industry effects mcluded? yes no yes yes yes yes 
R2 502 .483 492 504 .494 .501 
N 2,057 2,057 2,128 2,069 2,057 2,057 
NOTE -I-statIStics are In parentheses. To save space, coefficIents on dummy variables representmg workers' occupation, geographIcal regIOn, and Industry are not reported but 
are avatlable from the author on request 
Table 4 
Quit Equations 
(Estimated with Hazard Model Assummg an Exponential DIstribution) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0 Constant -2.79 -304 -142 - 264 -.757 -.707 
0 (-7.54) (-375) (- 91) (-19) (-.24) (-.96) 
"0 
::; TOP WAGE -.962 -.962 -.799 -.795 6· 
(-4.61) (-4.30) (-2.52) (-2.24) ;::!: 
@ ALTERNATE WAGE 263 878 1.582 679 .150 
N ( 73) (.50) ( 27) ( 05) ( 01) 
0 Worker charactenstlcs· ~ 
~ AGE/I00 -4.56 -474 -2.84 -2.85 -253 ~ \J> (- 81) (- 34) (- 09) (-.12) (-.61) 
= a--
;0 (AGE/100)2 2.96 279 0647 .203 - 215 
6· (.37) (.15) (.002) (.01) (-.03) ::r 
Cii I IF MALE .0443 - 162 0195 - 0031 0285 
;0 ( 12) (-.13) (.07) (-.01) ( 22) 
CD 
CJ) EXPERIENCE/I 00 .0548 -.0951 00000 - 0445 -.0230 
CD 
:< (.18) (-II) (.000) (-.03) (-.10) 
CD (EXPERIENCE/I 00)2 - 0561 -.0124 - 0379 -.0291 - 0342 c. 
(- 62) (- 05) (-.07) (-.07) (- 39) 
EDUCATION .0393 -.00062 .0330 .0363 0417 
( 56) (- 003) ( 07) ( 10) (125) 
Turnover costs. 
SCREENING/I 00 -2.16 -197 -204 -204 
(-2.35) (-201) (-219) (-2.19) 
TRAINING/l 00 - 499 -.498 - 599 - 600 
(-3.02) (-2.68) (-3.53) (-3.60) 
Labor market conditIOns. 
LOCAL UNEMP RATE -23.1 -189 -186 -18.6 
0 (-455) (-3.44) (-3.46) (-3.64) 
0 INDUSTRY UNEMP RATE -417 -8.69 -679 -680 
"0 
::; (-133) (-293) (-2.41) (-2.41) 
6' Firm charactenstlcs. ;::!: 
PCTUNION -.565 - 389 -.518 -.518 @ 
(-224) (-1.19) (-1.62) (-1.98) N 
0 CAPITAL EQUIP-LABOR RATIO 898 115 .190 0 
~ ( 13) (.02) (.03) 
~ +- PCT WHITE-COLLAR - 215 - 302 -.303 V> (-108) (-1.57) (-1 58) ;0 '-J 
cO' PCTCRAFT -.644 -.749 -.746 
::r 
(-136) (-179) (-2.81) Cii 
;0 FIRM SIZE -.163 - 173 -.173 
CD (-3.42) (-3.93) (-423) CJ) 
CD 
:< Industry effects Included' no no no yes yes yes CD c. Log likelihood -1,445.1 -1,425.6 -1,260.6 -1,241.5 -1,250.7 -1,250.7 
Hazard rate 0199 .0194 0166 .0157 .0160 .0160 
N 2,246 2,246 2,108 2,108 2,108 2,108 
NOTE -I-statIStIcS are In parentheses In cols 1-5 the standard errors (and thus the I-statIStIcs) were adjusted with the method discussed In Murphy and Topel (1985) to account 
for the fact that the alternate wage was obtained from the J'red,cted values from a hrevlOus regressIOn To save space, coeffiCients on dummy vanables representIng workers' 
occupatIon, geographic regIOn, and Industry are not reporte but are avatlable from t e author on request 
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The cost of screening and training the most recently hired worker is 
included because firms with higher turnover costs have a greater incentive 
to deter turnover and, as predicted by condition (D), should thus have the 
lowest quit rates. The quit rate is also likely to depend on labor market 
conditions since workers will be less likely to quit if Jobs are scarce. Labor 
market conditions are measured by the average local and industry unem-
ployment rates in the period over which the worker was employed. 12 In 
addition, the quit rate is likely to depend on the unionization rate. Freeman 
( 1980) argues that unions provide a voice for workers' grievances and thus 
give dissatisfied workers an alternative to qUItting. Independent of the 
effect of unions on wages and wages on quits, highly unionized firms 
ought to experience fewer quits. 
Column 1 of table 4 Includes only the wage and the alternate wage, 
column 2 adds characteristics of the worker, and column 3 adds the other 
variables discussed above. In column 4 all the variables appearing in the 
wage equation are included in the quit equation. Since the wage is actually 
an endogenous variable that is set at its optimal level by the firm (takIng 
into account its effect on the quit rate), it is omitted in column 5. Finally, 
the alternate wage is also omitted In column 6 because it is highly correlated 
with the worker characteristics. 
FIndings 
To determine whether conditions (A), (B), and (C) are satisfied, It IS 
necessary to know the value of 't and the values of the derivatives of the 
quit function. Unfortunately, the EOPP survey asks only about the time 
spent training workers in their first month and thus does not take into 
account training outside the firm, training given after the first month, and 
exit costs. A more comprehensive estimate of the cost of turnover comes 
from a study by the M & M ASSOCiation ( 1980), which estimated the cost 
of hiring, training, and exit for different classes of workers.13 Given the 
composition of workers in the sample, the average turnover cost is about 
$3,500 (about 4 month's salary for the average worker in the sample), so 
this value wIll be used for 'to 
With the proportional hazard model, the quit rate and ItS derivatives 
can be expressed as 
12 Note that these unemployment rates dIffer from the unemployment rates that 
appear in the wage equatlon, which are the unemployment rates in 1979. 
t3 ThIS 1980 study mcluded in its measure of turnover costs the cost of advert!S!ng 
for the positlon, travel expenses for the recrUIter and/ or applIcant, administratlve 
costs (e.g., intervlewmg and reference checks), the cost of medical exammatlons 
and induction procedures, the cost of substandard productlon of new employees, 
the tlme spent by current employees m providmg on-the-Job traming, and severance 
pay. The study estimated the cost of turnover to be $3,611 75 for production workers, 
$2,291.50 for office and technical workers, and $10,35616 for salaned employees. 
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(3) 





_ /31/33 (.) qwu - e, 
w 
(3c) 
where a and the /3's are the coefficients and e(·) is the hazard rate reported 
in table 4. Note that the wage must be expressed in terms of monthly 
earnings since q( w, w a , U) is the monthly quit rate. 14 The average wage 
is $5.45 an hour or about $895 a month. 
Condition (A) predicts that -'tqw = 1. If the average wage and the values 
of /31 and the hazard rate from table 4 are substituted into (3a), qw is 
calculated to lie between -0.0000139 and -0.0000214. The maximum value 
for -'tqw is 0.0749, which is far less than predicted. Note that qw rises in 
absolute value (i.e., becomes more negative) as w falls since qww > o. Thus, 
the wage that would satisfy condition A is lower than the wage that firms 
actually pay. The low value of 'tqw is incompatible with an efficiency wage 
model in which firms maximize short-run profits and in which turnover 
costs playa significant role. These results, however, may be compatible 
with an efficiency wage model in which firms pay wages to maximize 
long-run profits or in which the effect of wages on productivity strongly 
outweighs the effect of wages on turnover costs. 
Condition (B) predicts that dw/d't = -qw/'tqww. From (3a) and (3b), 
it can be shown that -qw/'tqww = -W/['t(/31 - 1)]. If the average wage, 
the estimated value of 't, and the value of /31 from table 4 are substituted 
mto this equation, -qw/ 'tqww is calculated to lie between 0.130 and 0.142. 
In table 3,15 the coefficient on TRAINING lies between 0.00124 and 
0.00129. This value, however, represents the effect of an additional hour 
of training on wages, not the effect of an additional dollar of training costs. 
To convert figures on hours of trammg into dollar amounts, It will be 
assumed that individuals in charge of recruiting and training new workers 
14 While the wage vanable appearing m the wage equation IS the log of the hourly 
wage, the units are Irrelevant because of the logarithmIc specificatIOn. 
15 Smce the top wage appears m the quit equations, the estimates of dw / d't and 
dw / d U were obtained from the equations for the top wage 
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earn the same wage as the recruit's top wage and that fringe benefits add 
27% to the cost of an employee. 16 With these assumptions, it is calculated 
that d In( w)/ dTRAINING$ averages 0.000105. 17 At the average monthly 
wage of $895, dw/dTRAINING$ = 0.0940 (recall that d In(w) = dw/ 
w), a value 66%-72% the size of -qw/tqww. 
Because SCREENING and TRAINING are correlated, SCREENING 
is insignificant in the regressions in which TRAINING also appears. Thus, 
the best estimate of the coefficient on SCREENING is probably found in 
column 3, in which TRAINING is omitted. With this value of the coef-
ficient on SCREENING, calculations similar to those above show that 
dw / dSCREENING$ = 0.0944, which is 66%-73% the size of -qw/tqww. 
These values are consistent with the model in which firms pay efficiency 
wages and in which wages affect both turnover and productivity.18 
These findmgs do not, though, conclusively prove that firms with higher 
training costs pay higher wages to deter turnover. It could be argued that 
the positive effect of training costs on wages results only from the fact 
that traming makes workers more productive, rather than from firms' deSire 
to reduce turnover. The coefficient on TRAINING, however, seems too 
large to account for the effect of training on productivity. When the coef-
fiCient on EDUCATION IS adjusted to account for the fact that EDU-
CATION is measured in years while TRAINING is measured in hours, 
the coefficient on TRAINING is 40-50 times larger than the coefficient 
on EDUCATION. It seems implaUSible that training by one's firm increases 
an individual's productivity that much more than schooling. While it may 
be argued that an mdividual is acquiring more practical skills from on-
the-job training than from schooling, regressions with data from the second 
EOPP survey indicate that the effect of vocational training (which rep-
resents practical traming) on wages is half the size as the effect of schooling. 
Thus, while the coefficient on TRAINING seems much too large to account 
16 ThiS figure was obtaIned from Munnell ( 1988) for 1980. It represents spendIng 
on nonwage compensatIon and wages for time not worked as a percentage of wages 
for tIme worked. Thus, the cost of an additional hour of training is the traIner's 
wage (estImated as the average top wage for workers in the sam pIe, which is $5 45) 
plus the recruit's startIng wage (which averages $4.10), all times 1.27 The cost of 
an additional hour of screenIng IS the screener's wage (again estimated at $5.45) 
times 1.27 Thus, to calculate how much a $1 Increase in turnover costs raises 
wages, the coefficient on TRAINING must be diVided by 12.1, and the coeffiCIent 
on SCREENING must be dlVlded by 6.9. 
17 TRAINING$ represents the cost of traInIng In dollar terms, whIle TRAINING 
represents the number of hours spent traInIng. The same notatIon IS used for 
SCREENING. 
18 The fact that TRAINING and SCREENING do not represent the full cost 
of turnover should not affect these results SInce the Issue IS not the magmtude of 
turnover costs but the effect on wages of a $1 Increase in turnover costs. 
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for the effect of traIning on productivity, its size is consistent with the 
effiCIency wage model. 
Condition (C) predicts that a rise in the unemployment rate lowers the 
wage and, in particular, that dw/dU = -qwu/qww. From (3b) and (3c), 
it can be shown that -qwu/ qww = /33W /( 1 - /3,). Two unemployment rates 
were considered In this study: the unemployment rate in the local labor 
market and the industry unemployment rate. The coefficient on the local 
unemployment rate is always insignificant and, in fact, is sometimes positive 
in the equations for the starting wage. If the average wage and the values 
for /3, and /33 (for the local unemployment rate) from table 4 are substituted 
into the expression for -qwu/ qww, it is calculated to lie between -9,420 
and -11,490. In table 3, d In(w)/dU lies between -0.72 and -0.87 for 
the local unemployment rate, so that dw /dUhes between -644 and -779, 
which is 5%-9% the size of -qwu/ qww. This is much smaller than the 
efficiency wage model predicts. 
A possible explanation why the coefficients on the local unemployment 
rate are insigmficant and much smaller than predicted IS that previous 
researchers (e.g., Hall 1972; Reza 1978; Adams 1985; and Marston 1985) 
have found that wages tend to be higher in areas with high unemployment 
and have generally considered the higher wages to be a compensating 
differential for the higher probability of unemployment. It IS possible that 
the two effects of local unemployment on wages (i.e., the fact that high 
unemployment lessens the need for firms to pay high wages to reduce 
turnover and the fact that higher wages serve as a compensating differential 
for areas with high unemployment) nearly cancel out, so that the net effect 
is small. 
Better results were obtained with the indmtry unemployment rate, which 
is always negative and significant at the 1 % level. Note that some of the 
regressions include dummy variables for the one-digit SIC industry, while 
others do not. Since the Industry unemployment rates are highly correlated 
With the industry dummies, it is important to compare coefficients from 
wage equations and quit equations that either both omit the industry dum-
mies or both include the industry dummies. Consider first wage and quit 
equations both omitting the Industry dummies. Column 3 of table 4 in-
cludes the industry unemployment rate but does not include the industry 
dummies. From the coefficients in this column, -qwu/ qww IS calculated to 
equal -2,070. Column 2 of table 3 also includes the industry unemployment 
rate but does not include the industry dummies. In this column, dIn (w) / 
dU = -1.41, meanmg that dw/dU = -1,260, which is 61% the size 
of -qwu/ qww· 
Now consider wage and quit equations including the industry dummies. 
The industry unemployment rate, the industry dummies, and the wage all 
appear in column 4 of table 4. With the coefficients in this column, -qwu/ 
qww = -4,330. The industry unemployment rates and the industry dummies 
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appear in columns 1, 3, 4, and 6 of table 3. From these coefficients, dw / 
dU is calculated to lie between -1,720 and -1,930, which is 40%-45% 
the size of -qwu/ qww. 
While dw/d't, dw/dU, -qw/'tqww, and -qwu/qww were calculated at 
the average monthly wage for all workers in the sample, the relationships 
between dw/d't and -qw/'tqww, and between dw/dU and -qwu/qww are 
independent of the wage smce these expressions are all linear functions 
of the wage. Thus, the same relationships between these expressions 
would be found for workers paid any wage, not just for workers paid the 
average wage. 
Condition (D), which predicts a negative correlation between a firm's 
turnover cost and its quit rate, is satisfied. In the quit equations reported 
in table 4, the coefficient on SCREENING is negative and significant at 
the 5% level, and the coefficient on TRAINING is negative and significant 
at the 1 % level, suggesting that firms with high turnover costs actively try 
to discourage quits through actions besides paymg good wages. (Recall 
that the wage is included as an explanatory variable in half of these regres-
sions.) Th1s is an important result, as 1t indicates that reducmg quits is an 
1mportant consideration for firms with high turnover costs. It strengthens 
the argument that reducing turnover is the reason why firms w1th high 
turnover costs pay higher wages. 
The results also support the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists 
between the wage and firm characteristics ra1sing workers' productivity. 
The coefficient on the capital equipment/labor ratio is always positive; in 
the 10 columns of tables 2 and 3 in which it appears, it is significant at the 
5% level in nine equations and sigmficant at the 1 % level in six equations. 
As expected, this coefficient 1S much larger and more significant than the 
coefficient on the total cap1tal-Iabor ratio. 19 
In add1tion, the coefficients on PCT WHITE-COLLAR and PCT 
CRAFT are always positive and significant at the 1 % level, meaning that 
workers who work with a high proportion of skilled coworkers receive 
higher wages on average. If workers of different occupations are comple-
ments in the production process, it makes intuiuve sense that firms em-
ploying many highly skilled workers find it optimal to pay good wages 
to all their workers. First, working with skilled coworkers increases the 
resources at one's disposal and thus raises the potential gain from an increase 
in effort. Second, the producuv1ty of one's coworkers may depend on how 
19 While other economists have shown that the capItal-labor ratio has a posltlve 
effect on wages (see Dickens and Katz [1987] for a review of these studies), this 
is the first time to my knowledge that it has been shown that the capital equipment/ 
labor ratio has a much greater Impact on wages than does the total capital-labor 
ratio. 
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hard one works.20 These results may help explain Dickens and Katz's (1987) 
and Krueger and Summers's (1987) findings that certain industries pay 
higher wages to workers of all occupations. 
If firms differ in turnover costs and in characteristics affecting produc-
tivity, the wage that maximizes profits will vary across firms (even if they 
hire Identical workers), possibly explaining why studies have found sig-
nificant effects of industry dummy variables on wages. 
v. Conclusion 
In the Journal of EconomIc Perspectzves, Richard Thaler (1989, p. 190) 
writes, "Are the firms that pay high wages those who would gain the most 
from an increase in worker effort? ... Are the industries that pay high 
wages those with the highest turnover costs? Who knows?" This study 
answers these questions in the affirmative. It not only shows that firms 
with the highest turnover costs pay the highest wages but also shows that 
efficiency wage theory does a reasonably good job of predicting the degree 
to which turnover costs raise wages. 
Condition (B) expresses the effect of turnover costs on wages as a function 
of the first and second derivatives from the quit function. The effect on 
wages of a $1 rise in turnover costs is smaller than predicted by the model 
ignoring the effect of wages on productivity, but is reasonable if allowance 
is made for the fact that wages affect productivity as well as turnover. In 
contrast, these results are not consistent with a perfectly competitive labor 
market m which workers of identical ability earn the same wage at any 
firm since the effect of turnover costs on wages appears much too large to 
be explamed by the effect of training on workers' productivity. These 
results are also probably not consistent with a model in which firms are 
labor-supply constrained and face an upward-sloping supply curve for 
labor since in that case the relationship between turnover costs and wages 
would likely be much different from that predicted by condition (B). Note 
that the wage equations and quit equations were estimated separately. 
Since there would be no reason for the coefficients from these equations 
to be related in the way predicted by condition (B) if the efficiency wage 
model did not explain wage behavior, these findings are quite remarkable.2I 
20 For example, If a firm employs many highly skilled workers and if their pro-
ductivity or their propensity to qUIt depends on the cleanlIness of the firm, it will 
make sense for the firm to pay its janItors well to Induce greater effort on their 
part. 
21 While slightly different results could be obtamed If different assumptIOns were 
made (e.g, about the magnitude of turnover costs or about how we convert figures 
on hours of trainIng Into dollar terms), we would have no reason to expect the 
coeffiCients to be of even the right order of magnitude If the effiCIency wage model 
were not valId. 
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Furthermore, the finding that firms with higher turnover costs experience 
fewer quits even when controlling for the wage provides further evidence 
that reducing quits IS an important consideration for firms with high turn-
over costs. 
When unemployment is measured by the industry unemployment rate, 
the effect of unemployment on wages is somewhat smaller than predicted 
by condition (C) but again is reasonable if wages affect productivity as 
well as qUltS. Again, it is unlikely that the coefficients from the wage and 
quit equations would be related in this way if efficiency wage theory were 
not valid. However, the effect of the local unemployment rate on wages 
is much smaller than predicted by condition (C), although this result may 
be explained by the findings of previous researchers that higher wages 
serve as a compensating differential for areas with hIgh unemployment. 
As predIcted by the general efficiency wage model in which wages affect 
both productivity and turnover, the wage depends positively on firm char-
acteristics that raise workers' productivIty such as the capital-labor ratio 
and the percentage of workers classified as white-collar or craft workers. 
However, a model in which firms pay equihbrium wages and face an 
upward-sloping supply curve for labor predicts the same result. These 
findings could also be conslStent with a model m which firms hIre m a 
perfectly competitive labor market if firm characteristlcs that raIse pro-
ductivity are posItively correlated WIth the portion of workers' ablhties 
that is unmeasured. Thus, these results are not conclusive evidence for 
efficiency wage theory. What is interesting about these results is the finding 
that the capital equipment/labor ratio far outperforms the total capital-
labor ratio in predicting wages. In addition, the finding that workers who 
work with a large proportion of highly skilled coworkers earn hIgher 
wages might help explain why certain industries pay higher wages to 
workers of all occupations. 
Finally, while 'tqw is lower than predicted by condItion (A), ItS value 
may be consistent with an efficiency wage model in which wages have a 
much greater effect on productivIty than on turnover costs or in which 
firms pay wages to maximize long-run profits. Promismg tOpICS for future 
research mIght be to explore the dynamICs through which wages could 
affect future productivIty and turnover costs and to try to estlmate the 
relative strengths of the effects of wages on productlvity and turnover 
costs. 
Appendix A 
An Efficiency Wage Model with Wages Affecting Productivity and 
Turnover 
Now suppose that workers' productlvity depends on their wage so 
that the production function can be wntten as 
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(AI) 
where e( w, 4» represents the efficiency of each unit of labor.22 The 
efficiency of each worker depends on the wage (w) and on a vector of 
firm characteristics affectmg productivity (4)), where ew > 0, eq, > 0, and 
ewq, > o. It is assumed that ewq, > 0 since a rise in a firm characteristic 
that raises workers' productivity (e.g., the capital-labor ratio) means that 
a given increase in the wage and hence in workers' effort results in a 
greater increase in output.23 
Under these assumptions, the profit function becomes 
1t = Pye(w, 4»L aK I - a - wL - rK - 'tq(w, w a , U)L. (A2) 
If (A2) is differentiated with respect to w, L, and K, the first-order 
conditions are 
0= d1t/dL = aPye(w, 4»L a- 1K I - a - w - 'tq(w, w a , U), (A4) 
and 
0= d1t/dK = (1 - a)Pye(w, 4»PK-a - r. (AS) 
If equation (A3) is divided by L and the capital-labor ratio (K/L) is 
represented by k, this equation can be expressed as 
(A6) 
Note that (A6) implies that -'tqw < 1 in a model in which wages affect 
both productivity and turnover. 
Dividing equation (A4) by (AS) yields the equation 
a 0= w + 'tq(w, w a , U) - -- rk. 
1 - a 
(A7) 
22 This speCIficatIOn assumes that output IS homogeneous of degree one with 
respect to the effiCIency of each worker but not with respect to the number of 
workers. It implies that If the effiCiency of each worker doubles, output will also 
double. But if the number of workers doubles, output will nse less than propor-
tionately Akerlof and Yellen (1986) defend thiS specification on the grounds that 
shlrkmg misuses other mputs as well as labor. Tn addition, an mcrease in workers' 
effort should result in other mputs bemg used more effiCIently. 
23 For example, If a wage mcrease causes workers to increase their effort by 10%, 
output will nse more at a firm With a high capital-labor ratio than at a firm With 
a low capital-labor ratIO. 
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If (A6) and (A7) are totally differentiated and put into matrix notation, 
the system of equations can be expressed as 
[
Pyewwk l-u - 'tqww (1 - a)Pyewk-U][dw] 
1 + 'tqw -[aj(1 - a)]r dk 
= [-Pyew",k I-u qw 'tqwu ][ ~~l. 
o -q -'tqu dU 
The determinant is 
det = -[aj(1 - a)]rPyewwk l- u + [aj(l - a)]r'tqWu, 
- (1 - a)Pyewk-u - (1 - a)'tqwPyewk-u. 
From (A7), w + 'tq can be substituted for the quantity [aj(1 - a)]rk 
in the first term to obtain 
+ + 
det = [aj(1 - a)]r'tqww - (1 - a)'tqwPyewk-u 
+ + 
- Pyewwk-u'tq + Pyk-U[-ewww - (1 - a)ew]. 
The SIgn of this determinant can be shown to be positive if the efficiency 
of labor can be expressed by the Cobb-Douglas function e( w, <jJ) 
= CWP<jJE, and if a > p. The second condition will be satisfied if the 
elasticity of output with respect to the number of workers exceeds the 
elasticity of output with respect to the wage (I.e., if a 10% increase in 
the number of workers raises output more than a 10% increase in 
the wage). 
From Cramer's Rule, the derivatives of the wage with respect to <jJ, 't, 





[aj(1 - a)]rPyew~l-u 
d > 0, et 
+ + 
dw = -[aj(l - a)]rqw + q(l - a)Pyewk-u > 0 
d't det ' 
dw = -[aj(1 - a)]r'tqwu + 'tqu(1 - a)Pyewk-u < 0 
dU det . 
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Note that when wages affect both productivity and turnover, dw / d't 
and dw/dU are smaller (in absolute value) than the expressions calculated 
in Section II, which include only the effect of wages on turnover. To 
get a general idea of how much smaller these expressions are when the 
productivity effect is present, let e represent the ratio of dw / d't 
calculated when the productivity effect is present to the value of dw / 
d't when it IS not present. Thus, 
e= 
{[u/(1 - u)]r'tqww - (1 - u)'tqwPyewk a 
- Pyewwk~a'tq + Pyk~a[ -ewww - (1 - u)ew]) 
{[u/(1 - u)]r'tqwwqw - (1 - u)'tqwPyewk~aqw 
- Pyewwk~a'tqqw - Pyk~aewwwqw - (1 - u)Pyk~aewqw} 
Note that from (A6) we can substitute (1 + 'tqw)k~1 for Pyewk~a, 
and from (A7) we can substitute (w + 'tq)k~1 for [u/(1 - u)]r. 
Furthermore, if it is assumed that e(w, ¢) = CWP¢E, it can be shown 
thateww = -(1-p)w~lew,sothatPyewwk~a= -(1-p)(1 +'tqw)k~IW~I. 
Making these substitutions and dividing the numerator and denominator 
by k~1 and qw yields 
e= (w+'tq)'tqww-(1-u)q(1 +'tqw)'tqww(qw)~1 
{(w+'tq)'tqMv-(I-u)'tqw(1 +'tqw)+(1-p)(1 +'tq,JW~I'tq 
+ (1 - p) (1 + 'tqw) - (1 - u) (1 + 'tqw)} 
It is possible to obtain rough estimates of e by substitutmg into the 
above equatIOn the parameters from the study and a range of values for 
u and p. To derive estimates of e, we will use (as in Sec. IV) the values 
of 't = 3,500 and w = 895. Equation (3) shows that q = e('), qw = (/31/ 
w)e('), and qww = [(j3f -/31)/w 2 ]e('), where e(') is the hazard rate. The 
values of /31 and the hazard rate from table 4 were substituted into the 
equations for q, qw, and qww' Values of 0.5 and 0.7 were used for u, and 
values of 0.1 and 0.4 were used for p (where p is the elasticity of output 
With respect to the wage). With these values, e ranged between 0.17 and 
0.70. Thus, if wages affect both productivity and turnover, d w / d 't 
should lie between about 17%-70% of -qw/'tqww' By a similar analysis, 
it can also be shown that dw/dU should lie between about 17%-70% 
of -qwu/ qww if wages affect both productivity and turnover. 
It IS interesting to note that with the values of /31 from table 4, -'tqw is 
much less than one (its highest value is 0.075), so that the left-hand side 
of condition A is much less than the right-hand side. However, these 
calculations show that It is possible for the left-hand sides of conditions 
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(B) and (C) to be a relatively large fraction of the right-hand sides, even If 
the left-hand side of condition (A) is a relatively small fraction of the right-
hand side. 
Appendix B 
A Model with a Labor-Supply Constrained Firm 
Suppose now that the firm is labor-supply constrained and faces an 
upward-sloping supply curve for labor. If L (w) represents the amount 
of labor supplied at the wage w (with L' > 0 and L" < 0), the firm's 
profits can be written as 
1t = PyL(w)aK1- a - wL(w) - rK - -rq(w, w a , U)L(w). (Bl) 
Differentiating (B 1) with respect to wand K yields 
d1t/dw = 0 = aPyL(w)a-1K 1-aL'(w) - wL'(w) - L(w) 
and 
d1t/dK = 0 = (1 - a)PyL(w)aK-a - r. (B3) 
If (B3) is solved for K and substituted into (B2), the followmg 
equation is obtained: 
(B4) 
- L(w) - -rq(w, w a , U)L'(w) - -rqw(w, w a , U)L(w). 
Totally differentiating (B4) with respect to w, -r, and U yields the 
following results: 
dw 
dU {a(l - a)[(1-a)/a1p(1/a)y(1/alyl-(1-a)/a1L" . 
- wL" - 2L' - -rqL" - 2-rqwL' - -rqwwL } 
Note that the signs of the numerators in both the above expressions 
are ambiguous (although the denominators must be negative for profit 
maximization). Thus, in a model in which firms are labor-supply 
constrained, the effect of turnover costs and unemployment on wages is 
ambiguous. 
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Finally, if productIvity is a function of the wage and firm characteristics 
raising productivity (i.e., productivity equals e(w, 41) as in App. A), it 
can be shown that dw / d41 is positive, meaning that firm charactenstics 
raising productivity would be likely to raise wages even if firms operate 
on their labor supply curves. 
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